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Introduction
Richard B. Freeman, Birgitta Swedenborg, and 
Robert Topel
The Swedish economic model is perhaps the most ambitious and publicized 
eﬀort by a capitalist market economy to develop a large and active welfare 
state. For a long time, many viewed the Swedish model as a more humane 
and successful form of capitalism and thus as a model for other countries 
to emulate. This view was shaken when Sweden fell into severe economic 
crisis in the early 1990s.
Between 1990 and 1993, open unemployment rose from 1.4 percent to 
9 percent of the labor force. An additional 5 percent of the labor force 
participated in labor market programs so that 14 percent of the labor force 
was jobless. The employment rate fell by 12 percentage points from its pre-
crisis peak. The economic decline brought government spending above 70 
percent of national income, raised the budget deﬁ  cit to 12 percent of gross 
domestic product (GDP), and forced the government to reduce public- sector 
employment. Between 1990 and 1994, the ratio of debt to GDP doubled. 
Even before the crisis, however, Sweden’s economic performance was not 
exemplary. Slow productivity growth had eroded Sweden’s position in real 
per capita income relative to other Organization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development (OECD) countries; private-  sector employment had not 
Richard B. Freeman is the Herbert Ascherman Professor of Economics at Harvard Uni-
versity and a research associate of the National Bureau of Economic Research. Birgitta Swe-
denborg is an economist and former vice president and research director of the Center for 
Business and Policy Studies (SNS) in Stockholm, Sweden. Robert Topel is the Isidore Brown 
and Gladys J. Brown Professor in Urban and Labor Economics at the Booth Graduate School 
of Business, University of Chicago, and a research associate of the National Bureau of Eco-
nomic Research.2        Richard B. Freeman, Birgitta Swedenborg, and Robert Topel
grown since the 1960s; and recurring current account deﬁ  cits led to currency 
devaluations. The Swedish model was no longer anyone’s envy.
In response to the crisis, Sweden undertook substantial and in some 
cases painful policy reforms to correct problems. These reforms presumably 
helped the economy recover more quickly from the economic decline than 
it otherwise would have, while still preserving the low levels of poverty and 
modest levels of income inequality that characterized the Swedish model. 
But even over a decade of recovery left some problems unresolved—partic-
ularly in the labor market, where employment did not recover to precrisis 
levels.
This volume is about Sweden’s recovery from crisis and the role that the 
country’s welfare state institutions and policy reforms played in that recov-
ery. Many of the reforms reﬂ  ect distinctly Swedish problems connected to 
its large welfare state. But Sweden’s experience has broader lessons for other 
countries. It is especially relevant as the United States and the rest of the 
world struggle with the ﬁ  nancial and economic crisis that began with the 
2007/ 2008 U.S. ﬁ  nancial meltdown. The immediate causes for Sweden’s early 
1990s crisis are similar to those that set oﬀ America’s late 2008 crisis: the 
deregulation of ﬁ  nancial markets and excessive credit expansion fueled a 
real estate bubble that burst, causing a contraction of economic activity 
that spread from the banking sector to the economy as a whole. Prior to 
the crises, moreover, both the United States and Sweden faced persistent 
deﬁ  cits in the balance of trade and in the government budget. In both cases, 
the ensuing economic contraction drew comparisons with the 1930s and 
induced huge injections of liquidity into the ﬁ  nancial system to avoid the 
collapse of banking and credit.
That Sweden recovered more rapidly than most analysts expected oﬀers 
an optimistic note about the possibility for recovery from the large eco-
nomic downturn with which the United States and the rest of the world are 
struggling as this volume goes to press. Sweden and the United States diﬀer 
greatly in various ways, from the size of the economy to the importance 
of the welfare state. The similarity in their economic crises highlights the 
universality of economic problems and suggests that diﬀerences in insti-
tutions notwithstanding, the United States and other countries may learn 
something from Sweden’s response to its earlier crisis. Indeed, some com-
mentators have drawn attention to the way Sweden successfully dealt with 
its ﬁ  nancial meltdown1 and present Sweden as a model for the United States 
and other countries to follow. What interests them now is Sweden’s ability to 
pragmatically deal with problems borne of policy blunders and unforeseen 
events—not its welfare state.
1. See, for example, Carter Dougherty, “Stopping a Financial Crisis, the Swedish Way,” 
New York Times, September 23, 2008, and Holger Schmieding, “A Lesson from Stockholm,” 
Newsweek, October 13, 2008. See also The Economist, “Stockholm Syndrome,” November 29, 
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NBER-SNS Analyses of the Swedish Economic Model
This book is the second National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) 
study of the Swedish economy. The ﬁ  rst study began in 1993, when the 
Center for Business and Policy Studies (SNS) and the NBER convened a 
team of American and Swedish economists to study the problems of the 
Swedish economy. The hope was that the combination of outside special-
ists, unencumbered by Swedish political discourse and sensibilities, and of 
Swedish economists, knowledgeable about Sweden’s data and institutions, 
could clarify issues and sharpen debate at a time of crisis in Sweden. As 
Sweden is an exemplar of the large welfare state, its experiences could also 
illuminate the economics of this variant of capitalism more broadly. Wel-
fare state and institutional interventions are so large in Sweden that if these 
policies have substantial economic consequences, they should show up in 
Sweden.
Much of what the American outsiders saw in Sweden puzzled them. They 
found it remarkable that Sweden had eliminated poverty through interven-
tions in markets without running into serious economic problems before the 
crisis. They wondered how wage-  bargaining institutions could compress 
the distribution of pay without creating widespread unemployment among 
the least skilled. If lower-  skilled Swedes were paid more than they would 
earn in an unconstrained market, why did employers continue to hire them? 
They wondered also at the market work ethic of Swedes in the face of a 
huge tax-  induced wedge between productivity and disposable income that 
produced a ratio of posttax spendable income to pretax earnings in Sweden 
that was less than half the comparable U.S. ratio. Why did the average Swede 
invest in schooling and work as much as they did (albeit less than Ameri-
cans), with limited pecuniary rewards? Was the early 1990s crisis the death 
knell of the welfare state, or was it a transient downturn that sensible policy 
reforms would cure?
The main conclusions of this ﬁ  rst study were presented at a conference in 
Stockholm in 1995 and published in the NBER volume The Welfare State 
in Transition in 1997 (Freeman, Topel, and Swedenborg 1997). The take-
  home message was that Sweden’s recovery required economic reforms to 
strengthen the role of the market in various domains. We argued that Swe-
den’s success in eliminating poverty and reducing inequality gave it economic 
space to make such reforms without undoing the welfare state successes that 
Assar Lindbeck had called a “major achievement of modern civilization.”2 
Given the crisis of the early to mid-  1990s, failure to make reforms indeed 
seemed to pose the greatest threat to the welfare state.
The analyses in The Welfare State in Transition suggested that the Swed-
ish welfare state was an interrelated system, whose parts ﬁ  t together and 
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reinforced each other in sometimes surprising ways. Researchers analyzing 
diﬀerent aspects of the Swedish economy stressed diﬀerent linkages, but the 
picture that emerged was of an economic system with a logic that diﬀered 
from that of the market-  driven United States. Welfare state and wage poli-
cies that limited poverty and inequality generated other policies designed to 
oﬀset the likely adverse economic eﬀects of the ﬁ  rst set of policies. For ex-
ample, wage compression was associated with near-  constant private-  sector 
employment, which meant that full employment required expansion of jobs 
in the public sector. This required high taxes, but it also required the produc-
tion of government services that people would support politically. In turn, 
high taxes made it easier for high- skill workers to accept wage compression. 
The taxes and compressed wage structure also raised the incentive for short 
working hours with long vacations, leading to work sharing of sorts. Finally, 
these incentives and responses fed back onto the industrial structure, regula-
tory policies, and wage and price determination.
Our analysis questioned the long- term viability and value of some of these 
policies due to the loss of economic eﬃciency at the tax and beneﬁ  t/  program 
levels the country had chosen. It highlighted the possible fragility of such 
a system when faced with economic problems and the need for changes in 
policies to sustain the system. We noted that some programs seemed rela-
tively ineﬀective in accomplishing their goals. The active labor market pro-
grams, which some analysts viewed as underpinning Sweden’s traditional 
full employment, in particular, did not appear to produce the beneﬁ  ts that 
justiﬁ  ed their large costs, and public works displaced private investment and 
production. Other spending programs, such as subsidized day care, caused 
huge distortions in private decision making. Regulations hindered competi-
tion and productivity growth. High marginal taxes and compressed wages 
distorted choices on the allocation of eﬀort and hours among activities and 
reduced investment in human capital from what it might otherwise have 
been. Generous social insurance beneﬁ  ts caused moral hazard and overuse 
of unemployment and sickness insurance. All of these distortions hindered 
economic growth.
Some critics viewed The Welfare State in Transition as slanted toward 
an Anglo-  American, market-  driven form of capitalism. It is true that the 
diﬀerence between the U.S. and Sweden’s welfare state aﬀected how the 
American economists saw issues, but our research was not a case of dueling 
paradigms. The Americans were impressed by Sweden’s success in eliminat-
ing poverty, especially given the failure of the U.S. War on Poverty. And the 
studies were undertaken with Swedish colleagues, some of whom viewed the 
U.S. economic model skeptically. In any case, we were not alone in worrying 
that Sweden faced large economic costs because of engineered outcomes 
that often diverged far from market fundamentals. Even before the crisis, 
Swedish policymakers had begun to reform the tax code and product market 
regulations, and ﬁ  rms and unions had moved toward more decentralized Introduction    5
wage setting. The crisis accelerated reform eﬀorts, forcing the government to 
reduce public- sector jobs and to cut the replacement rate for unemployment 
insurance, among other changes. The 1993 Lindbeck Report (Lindbeck et al. 
1994) criticized many aspects of the Swedish economy and suggested 113 
speciﬁ  c reforms to restore the country’s economic health.
How would Sweden deal with the crisis? The magnitude of the early 1990s 
Swedish economic decline led many economists and policymakers to fear 
that recovery would be long and arduous. Japan had experienced a decade 
of economic stagnation. Germany became mired in high joblessness and 
low growth as it struggled to join East Germany with West Germany. It was 
a decade after the Thatcher reforms before British economic performance 
picked up noticeably. And East European transition countries suﬀered years 
of economic decline before market capitalism began to improve outcomes 
compared to their communist past.
In 2005, we decided to do a follow- up analysis of the Swedish welfare state 
to assess its recovery from crisis, engaging most of the same analysts as in 
the original study. The result is the current volume, Reforming the Welfare 
State: Recovery and Beyond in Sweden. The main message here is that Swe-
den had a relatively robust and successful recovery in which the welfare state 
maintained low levels of poverty, even as market reforms led to modestly 
higher inequality. But the evidence also shows that the recovery did not bring 
Sweden back to the precrisis levels of employment, which previous policies 
may have made artiﬁ  cially high.
How robust was the recovery? It was stronger and faster than almost any-
one expected. Between 1995 and 2004, productivity grew at 2.4 percent 
annually, well above the OECD average of 2.2 percent. Manufacturing 
productivity grew faster than in any other OECD country.3 Overall eco-
nomic growth was higher than in any comparable period since the 1960s, 
and private-  sector employment expanded for the ﬁ  rst time in decades. In 
part, the robust recovery reﬂ  ects the fall of output far below productive 
capacity in the crisis. In part, it reﬂ  ects higher growth through much of the 
developed world after 1993. Sweden’s per capita output relative to other 
advanced countries remained below its precrisis level. But in contrast to 
the American experience, where gains from productivity growth largely 
went to the wealthiest, the Swedish recovery raised income throughout 
the income distribution, though more so for the higher paid than for the 
lower paid.
What policies contributed to the recovery? The ﬁ  rst important policy 
change was that Sweden adopted ﬂ  exible exchange rates and inﬂ  ation tar-
geting. This caused an immediate and substantial weakening of the cur-
rency, leading to a prolonged period of export-  led growth. The growth 
of exports put the current account into surplus for over a decade. Other 
3. See table 1.1 in the OECD Economic Surveys: Sweden report (2007).6        Richard B. Freeman, Birgitta Swedenborg, and Robert Topel
critical policy changes included a contraction of the public sector, reduced 
generosity in social insurance systems, and the deregulation of many mar-
kets. The accompanying appendix provides a broad overview of important 
reforms and shows that the country adopted more market- oriented policies 
in many domains. In the government sector, Sweden sought to eliminate its 
budget deﬁ  cit through expenditure cuts, tax hikes, and a slimmer public sec-
tor. These policies and the rapid economic growth in the recovery reduced 
government spending to 52 percent of GDP in 2006—higher than in most 
advanced countries, but signiﬁ  cantly below the precrisis level—and reduced 
central government debt from nearly 80 percent of GDP in 1996 to about 
half that in 2006—bringing Sweden in line with other advanced economies 
and well within EU guidelines.4
Did the crisis and ensuing reforms undo Sweden’s success in eliminating 
poverty and maintaining low levels of inequality? The interesting fact is that 
inequality and poverty did rise, but by remarkably little. The welfare state 
provided strong safety net support for those at the bottom of the income 
distribution so that poverty remained low. Inequality increased modestly (as 
it did in many countries), but Sweden remained among the lowest inequality 
countries in the world. Swedish income inequality remains far lower than 
in the United States and rose by less in the 1990s. The collective-  bargaining 
system proved ﬂ  exible to the needs of the economy in wage settlements, 
and the market-  oriented reforms that raised inequality provided incentives 
that seem to have helped the recovery. Swedish workers and young people 
responded to the new market realities with sizable mobility and investments 
in education. Educational earnings diﬀerentials that were modestly higher 
than in the past (but far below those in the United States) made university 
education more economically attractive. Sweden moved to the top of global 
rankings in the number of university graduates and PhDs relative to the 
age- relevant  population.
Were there economic problems that the recovery did not fully resolve? The 
recovery did not bring Sweden back to its historical position as an exemplar 
of high employment. As of 2006, the employment-  population ratio was 
substantially below precrisis levels. Labor force participation stabilized at 77 
percent of the working-  age population, below the government’s 80 percent 
target. In 2006, open unemployment was 5.4 percent (7.1 percent, accord-
ing to the International Labor Organization [ILO] deﬁ  nition, a measure 
that Sweden has now adopted and that adds students looking for work). 
With 2.6 percent of the workforce on active labor market programs, how-
ever, the joblessness rate was 8 percent—far above what it had been before 
the crisis—and by the ILO deﬁ  nition, joblessness exceeded 9 percent. One 
4. Government expenditures in percent of GDP went from 24 in 1950 to 30 in 1960, 43 in 
1970, 60 in 1980, 58 in 1990, 54 in 2000, and 52 in 2006. This ﬁ  rst reﬂ  ected the rapid expansion 
of the welfare state and then showed the gradual retrenchment after the 1990s crisis (Statistics 
Sweden 2008).Introduction    7
reason for high joblessness was that the duration of jobless spells increased 
to resemble the long periods found in many EU countries.
What has Sweden done since the recovery? In 2006, Sweden elected a center-
  right government that undertook further policy changes along the lines 
begun by the Social Democratic government that led the country during 
the recovery. The new government reduced replacement rates in unemploy-
ment insurance (UI) and limited the duration of beneﬁ  ts; it also changed 
and reduced the extent of active labor market programs. To assure incomes 
and work opportunities for low-  paid workers, the government introduced 
an earned income tax credit that was designed to draw them into employ-
ment while buttressing their living standards. It exempted individuals from 
payroll tax if they were unemployed, sick, or on early retirement for over a 
year, and it reduced taxes for ﬁ  rms. One of the contributors to this volume, 
Anders Forslund (2008), estimated that increasing work incentives may have 
lowered unemployment by 1.5 to 2 percentage points compared to what it 
otherwise would have been.5
Recovery and Beyond
The studies in this volume examine the way changes in the labor market, 
in tax and beneﬁ  t policies, in local government policy, and in industrial 
structure and international trade aﬀected Sweden’s recovery. The analyses 
clarify the trade-  oﬀs between the egalitarian outcomes that Sweden seeks 
and economic eﬃciency. Welfare state interventions that lower inequality 
generally distort private decisions and create social costs. The costs rise with 
the square of the distortions,6 so they can become very high in a large welfare 
state. This makes it important for Sweden to ﬁ  nd and adopt the least costly 
ways to attain given distributional goals and to weigh carefully the costs and 
beneﬁ  ts of redistribution. Whether any given level of egalitarian outcomes 
exceeds the costs of interventions is a value judgment to be made by Swedes, 
in general, and by Swedish policymakers, in particular.
Our studies ﬁ  t into the following three broad categories.
Income Equalization, Gender Equality, and Wage Compression
As noted, a hallmark of the Swedish welfare state is its far-  reaching 
egalitarianism. This equality has been achieved through a combination of 
wage- setting institutions that narrow the dispersion of market wages, of gov-
ernment beneﬁ  ts that supplement the incomes of the lower-  paid and non-
working population and that often encourage work by linking the beneﬁ  ts 
to employment, and of taxes that reduce the incomes of the higher paid.
5. Forslund (2008).
6. This is the standard result in computing welfare triangles, in which taxes or other costs 
induce behavioral responses that extract additional costs beyond the direct cost of the inter-
vention.8        Richard B. Freeman, Birgitta Swedenborg, and Robert Topel
In chapter 1, Anders Björklund and Richard Freeman examine the extent 
to which the economic crisis and recovery aﬀected the egalitarian goal of the 
welfare state. They show that while inequality increased in the 1990s, Sweden 
maintained its position as one of the most egalitarian economies in the world 
and continued its successful conquest of poverty. Rising inequality in Swe-
den took the form of faster income growth for higher- income families rather 
than of lower real income for poorer families. The welfare state buttressed 
the incomes of those at the bottom. The area in which inequality increased 
most dramatically was in the distribution of hours worked, due to a higher 
rate of nonemployment and lower labor force participation among low- wage 
individuals, reﬂ  ecting Sweden’s failure to recover its full employment status 
after the crisis. In their contribution to the ﬁ  rst NBER volume, Björklund 
and Freeman highlighted the fact that Sweden’s narrow income distribu-
tion reﬂ  ected not only a compressed wage structure, welfare state tax, and 
spending policy, but also reﬂ  ected narrow dispersion in hours worked, as 
most adults had jobs and worked comparable hours.
The increase in inequality raised incentives for some forms of productive 
behavior. Relative to others, earnings increased for persons with university 
degrees and in ﬁ  rms with greater value added. This presumably contributed 
to rising enrollment in higher education and to shifts in the workforce from 
lower-   to higher-  productivity sectors. The authors cite evidence that within 
Sweden, areas with higher inequality had greater growth over the period. 
Surprisingly, given that returns to higher education remained lower in Swe-
den than in most other advanced countries, Swedish young persons invested 
heavily in higher education, particularly at the doctorate level. Sweden pro-
duced ﬁ  ve times as many doctorate scientists and engineers per capita as 
the United States. The increased supply of relatively low-  cost (due to wage 
compression) scientiﬁ  c workers helped Sweden move to the forefront of 
OECD countries in research and development relative to GDP and placed 
it second to the United States in the OECD measure of investment in the 
knowledge economy.
Did the increased inequality aﬀect Swedish preferences for egalitarian 
outcomes? Survey evidence suggests that attitudes hardened against inequal-
ity, which may have inﬂ  uenced some reversals of policy when the crisis was 
over. There was no decrease in reported well-  being or life satisfaction, 
despite continued high joblessness, implying that the unemployed adapted 
their attitudes to the new state of the job market. Even with high levels of 
equality, Swedes still wanted greater equality.
Gender equality is another egalitarian goal to which Sweden is committed, 
and economic policy has sought to improve the economic status of women. 
In the 1997 NBER study, Sherwin Rosen noted that all employment growth 
from the 1960s to the 1990s occurred in the public sector, and virtually all of 
it occurred among women. He argued that subsidies to day care to encour-
age female employment were motivated as a second- best policy in a high- tax Introduction    9
society, but the Swedish level of subsidies was excessive and created large 
eﬃciency losses. In chapter 2 of this volume, Ann-  Soﬁ  e Kolm and Edward 
Lazear ask how two cornerstones of Swedish family policy—paid parental 
leave and subsidies to day care—and two additional policies that the country 
recently enacted—subsidies to other household goods and earned income 
tax credit—aﬀect the incentive to work of married and divorced women 
with children. They note that paid parental leave encourages labor force 
participation of mothers but prolongs the periods that mothers stay home 
with their children, which may reduce future income. Reserving a month 
of paid parental leave for fathers induces women to return to work sooner. 
Subsidizing day care encourages market work and improves the future eco-
nomic situation of mothers, including single mothers. Because of this, single 
mothers are more likely to be self- suﬃcient than to be dependent on the state. 
This reduces Rosen’s estimated social cost of the program. In- work beneﬁ  ts 
aimed at low-  income women with children can increase labor force partici-
pation, at the cost of negative incentive eﬀects at the incomes where the tax 
credit is phased out. On net, Kolm and Lazear conclude that the programs 
strengthen the economic independence of women. They create a high excess 
burden by being ﬁ  nanced through higher taxes, but because the beneﬁ  ts go 
disproportionately to women, while the costs are borne disproportionately 
by men, the policies aid women.
Despite their institutional diﬀerences, both Sweden and the United States 
are among the world’s leaders in female market work. Female labor force 
participation is somewhat higher in Sweden than in the United States, but 
annual work hours among women aged 16 to 54 years in Sweden are 12 per-
cent lower than in the United States—988 annual hours in Sweden versus 
1,118 in the United States. However, women with children are more likely to 
be in the workforce in Sweden than in the United States, plausibly because 
of the subsidization policies.
High rates of unionization and collective bargaining are central to the 
Swedish model. The analysis in our earlier volume stressed the importance 
of collective bargaining in compressing wages and expressed concern that 
solidarity wage policy that raised the pay of the less skilled would eventu-
ally increase their unemployment. This appears to have happened to some 
extent. In chapter 3, Peter Fredriksson and Robert Topel note that since the 
crisis, wage formation has become more decentralized. Centralized bargain-
ing continues to set minimum wages in diﬀerent sectors, but ﬁ  rms and unions 
bargain above the minimum and decide on speciﬁ  cs in local bargaining. The 
decentralization contributed to rising wage dispersion, as wage outcomes 
were more likely to reﬂ  ect market valuations for particular skills. The ratio 
of 90th percentile to 10th percentile of gross earnings of full-  time workers 
in Sweden increased substantially from 1992 to 2003. In 1992, the wage of 
an individual at the 90th percentile of the wage distribution was about 73 
percent higher than that of a worker at the 10th percentile. By 2003, the 10        Richard B. Freeman, Birgitta Swedenborg, and Robert Topel
90th-  percentile wage was over double the 10th-  percentile wage. Even with 
this increase, however, the 90/  10 wage ratio in Sweden was far below that in 
the United States in 2003.
Some of the 1990s increase in wage dispersion in Sweden presumably 
reﬂ  ects catching up with market forces, but the catch- up does not seem com-
plete, given the changing economic environment. Joblessness remains high. 
The immigrant population from non-  OECD countries, who are dispropor-
tionately in lower- skill groups, is much larger than in the past and now makes 
up roughly the same proportion of the working-  age population as in the 
United States. Also, global competition in traded goods and services with 
low-  wage countries has become more intense. The educational premium 
remains low, and like other dimensions of compressed wage diﬀerences, it 
may impede human capital investment, which is key to economic growth 
and long-  run welfare. Assuming that an additional year of schooling raises 
skill proportionately as much in Sweden as in other advanced economies, 
we would expect to ﬁ  nd similar ﬁ  nancial returns to schooling in Sweden as 
elsewhere. In fact, the Swedish returns are much lower, reﬂ  ecting the com-
pression of diﬀerentials due to wage-  setting institutions. The low return 
to education in the late 1960s through the 1980s kept enrollment in higher 
education below what it otherwise would have been, but enrollments rose 
as the diﬀerentials widened and would likely rise even more with higher 
returns. Egalitarian wage policies also may have reduced Sweden’s stock of 
highly skilled workers by encouraging the most skilled Swedes to emigrate. 
Immigrants from egalitarian Nordic countries are especially concentrated 
at the top of the U.S. wage distribution.
Employment outcomes are worse for low- skilled persons and non- OECD 
immigrants than for other workers. In 2003, the employment gap between 
non-  OECD immigrants and the Swedish-  born population was 23 per-
centage points. The small market for private services in Sweden may help 
explain this. If Sweden had the U.S. mix of industries, the greater scale of 
retail trade, hotels, and restaurants would have raised employment for the 
low skilled by about 6 percent. However, in the 1990s, the minimum wage 
increased in hotels and restaurants, which disproportionately employ the 
less skilled, presumably contributing to the low share of these sectors in the 
economy.
Impacts of Compressed Incentives
How have labor supply decisions responded to the taxes and beneﬁ  ts of 
the welfare state and to the changes in those taxes and beneﬁ  ts during the 
recovery? Economists emphasize that incentives matter in decisions, but 
the key issue is how much they matter. Measured by number of contracted 
hours of work, the evidence in all countries is that men do not alter hours 
worked much to changes in incentives, while women alter hours moderately. 
In Sweden, estimated elasticities of hours worked to net wages are on the Introduction    1 1
order of 0.05 to 0.12. Distortions in choices other than simple hours, such 
as educational and occupational choice and entrepreneurial activity, are 
more diﬃcult to measure.
In chapter 4, Thomas Aronsson and James Walker survey studies on labor 
supply from crisis through recovery. They note that the welfare state creates 
strong incentives to be in the labor force by making many beneﬁ  ts condi-
tional on labor force participation, but it also creates strong incentives not 
to work many hours, which helps explain why Swedes work relatively few 
hours. Much of the labor supply adjustment in Sweden, however, takes place 
in dimensions other than contracted hours of work. One such adjustment 
is through sickness absence. Swedes, like people in other developed coun-
tries, have steadily gotten healthier since the 1960s. The physical burden of 
the typical job has declined, and life spans have increased with advances in 
medical care and public health. Yet, Swedes are more prone to take sickness 
leave than in the past, and Sweden has proportionately more persons on 
sickness leave than any other country. Why? The natural explanation is the 
generous social insurance system and associated moral hazard to make use 
of the system, even when one is not truly sick. Empirical studies show that 
sickness absence in Sweden varies when qualifying periods and replacement 
rates change. There is substantially more absence when it is less costly to call 
in sick. Another area of adjustment is in the length of working life, which in 
part depends on pension policies. Sweden’s 1999 pension reform converted 
a deﬁ  ned beneﬁ  t system to a notional deﬁ  ned contribution system, quasi-
 funded and more actuarial. The reform increased the long- term viability of 
the pension system and improved incentives to save and work. Here, Sweden 
is ahead of the United States—where the private pension system has been in 
crisis and where there is no national consensus on how to deal with Social 
Security—and the United Kingdom, where pension system reforms created 
a funding crisis.
Empirical evidence on the elasticity of taxable income with respect to the 
marginal tax rate suggests higher labor supply responses in other dimen-
sions than in hours worked. Taxable income captures not only the eﬀects 
of taxes and a compressed wage distribution on hours of work but also 
their eﬀects on eﬀort, career choice, and grey economy activity. Swedish 
studies ﬁ  nd an elasticity of taxable income in response to tax rates com-
parable to U.S. estimates—around 0.4. Holmlund and Söderström (2008) 
report that as a result of responses to high taxes, lowering top marginal rates 
would have little eﬀect on tax revenues. Another Swedish study explains 
the greater market work in the United States than in Sweden by diﬀerences 
in taxes.
A cornerstone of the Swedish model is reliance on active labor market 
policy (ALMP) to deal with labor market problems. One controversial ﬁ  nd-
ing in our earlier volume was that labor market programs did little to move 
workers to employment and were not worth the substantial resources that 12        Richard B. Freeman, Birgitta Swedenborg, and Robert Topel
the country devoted to them. In chapter 5 in this volume, Anders Forslund 
and Alan Krueger report that ALMP did little to help Sweden recover from 
the unemployment crisis of the early 1990s. During the 1990s, unemploy-
ment increased more rapidly and fell more slowly than one would expect 
from historical experience. Both the inﬂ  ow to unemployment and the dura-
tion of unemployment increased. Duration peaked in 1995 at twenty-  ﬁ  ve 
weeks unemployment, but when treating breaks in unemployment due to 
participation in ALMP as part of joblessness, jobless durations increased 
steadily during the 1990s, reaching 110 weeks (over two years) by 2000. 
Over 14 percent of the unemployed in 1999 and over 7 percent in 2005 were 
registered as unemployed for more than three years. The ALMP contributed 
to long jobless durations by allowing participants to remain eligible for con-
tinued unemployment beneﬁ  ts.
If ALMP training produced better matches between workers and jobs 
or if it improved skills, the beneﬁ  ts from the programs might exceed the 
cost of inducing longer periods of joblessness. Evaluation studies of the 
eﬀectiveness of particular programs, however, indicate that training pro-
grams in the 1990s had little or no impact on labor market success. Perhaps 
the rapid growth of the programs in the crisis and the fact that participation 
qualiﬁ  ed people for unemployment insurance reduced their eﬀectiveness as 
training. The only programs that led to a new job more quickly than simple 
job search were those that most resembled regular jobs. But the more the pro-
gram resembles regular jobs, the more likely it is that the program displaces 
private-  sector jobs that produce the same or similar services. Estimates 
of this displacement eﬀect are well over 50 percent. It is noteworthy that 
time-  use data shows that unemployed Swedes spend considerably less time 
(one-  tenth the time) on job search than do unemployed American workers. 
A plausible reason is the more generous unemployment compensation in 
Sweden.
In 2000, Sweden changed its ALMP policies. It broke the link between 
program participation and UI so that participation in ALMPs would no 
longer qualify an individual for new periods of UI. It introduced the activ-
ity guarantee, which requires full-  time presence of the participants—time 
that participants can use for job search or for other program participation, 
such as job training, at the normal UI rate. This is designed to rule out 
participants who are using UI to ﬁ  nance leisure or to supplement black 
market income.
A major concern in our earlier study was that the crisis would produce 
the long spells of unemployment and high inequality in job holding found 
in many large EU countries. That is what happened. In chapter 6, Lars 
Ljungqvist and Thomas Sargent argue that the reason is that the unemploy-
ment beneﬁ  t system has not adjusted to new forms of economic turbulence. 
Building on their contribution to our 1997 volume, they identify institu-
tional features that might explain diﬀerences in equilibrium unemployment Introduction    1 3
between a welfare state like Sweden’s and a more laissez-  faire economy like 
that in the United States.
The problem in attributing the greater unemployment in Sweden and 
much of Europe to generous welfare state beneﬁ  ts is that the countries with 
large welfare states and more generous unemployment beneﬁ  ts had lower 
unemployment than the United States from the 1950s through the 1970s and 
had higher unemployment thereafter. The question is, why would welfare 
state policies contribute to unemployment in the latter period and not in the 
former? The authors observe that the change in relative unemployment rates 
was not due to an increased inﬂ  ow of persons to unemployment but rather 
to increased unemployment duration. In Europe, duration increased so that 
the long-  term unemployed came to make up about half of total unemploy-
ment, while in the United States, the durations of unemployment spells did 
not change much. They argue that the change is due to the interaction of 
welfare state beneﬁ  ts with changing economic shocks. In the 1950s through 
the 1970s, employment protection and generous UI lowered frictional unem-
ployment in Europe. In the 1980s to 2000s, by contrast, they hypothesize that 
technological change and globalization meant that the skills of unemployed 
workers became obsolete more quickly, which meant that the long duration 
of UI eligibility in Europe came to prolong the duration of joblessness. The 
reason is that unemployment insurance is paid relative to the past wage, so if 
skills decline, thereby reducing earnings on a new job, workers have a greater 
incentive to stay on beneﬁ  ts.
Ljungqvist and Sargent also develop a new indicator of joblessness in 
Sweden that treats the growth of the number of persons on long-  term sick-
ness leave and early retirement as a disguised part of unemployment. They 
take the percentage of individuals who were on long-  term sickness leave or 
early retirement in 1974 and 1963 respectively as estimates of the size of 
those populations in the absence of the later shocks that induced overuse 
of the beneﬁ  t systems, and they treat the increased percentages of persons 
on those programs over time as disguised unemployment. Adding this form 
of joblessness to measured unemployment produces an adjusted jobless rate 
for Sweden in 2005 of nearly 16 percent of the labor force.
Industrial Structure, Public Sector, and International Trade
Steven Davis and Magnus Henrekson in chapter 7 argue that Sweden is 
missing less- skilled jobs that compete with household or black market work. 
These jobs are found in the private-  service sector, which is exceptionally 
small in Sweden. They attribute the missing jobs to tax policies and wage-
  setting practices that distort the industrial structure of employment.
Tax policy distorts the industrial structure by creating a tax wedge between 
what the buyer of services must earn before tax to purchase the service and 
what the seller of a service receives net of tax. The bigger the wedge, the 
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this wedge is twice as big as in the United States. The authors estimate that a 
Swedish buyer of a service must earn 2.5 to 3.5 times more than the seller of 
the service to make it fruitful to buy services rather than to do it themselves. 
High payroll, income taxes, and consumption taxes make it economically 
sensible for many persons to engage in household and black market produc-
tion rather than to buy services in the market, even though the market is 
more productive in delivering those services. The compression of the wage 
distribution makes it more expensive for the more skilled to hire the less 
skilled to undertake various jobs, while lowering the opportunity cost of the 
more skilled to do the work. The result is an ineﬃcient allocation of time and 
eﬀort. They also suggest that within the service sector, employment protec-
tion may make it diﬃcult for small ﬁ  rms to form and expand, particularly 
in competition with the public sector in social service production.
Consistent with this, time-  use surveys reveal that Swedes devote more 
time to household work than do Americans, who are more likely to rely on 
markets. Many Swedes also work in the underground economy. Statistics 
Sweden now makes an upward adjustment to Swedish GDP accounts to 
capture black market activities. The largest adjustments are in auto repairs, 
restaurants, taxi services, and hair dressing. The National Tax Board esti-
mates black market activity at 4 to 5 percent of GDP. Davis and Henrekson 
conclude that because manufacturing is unlikely to be an engine of job 
growth, Sweden will need to consider policies to encourage the develop-
ment of private-  service jobs. Finally, they note that cross-  country evidence 
indicates that high taxes reduce the employment and output shares of tax-
  sensitive industries, such as retail trade, hotels, and restaurants.
In their contribution to the ﬁ  rst NBER-  SNS study, Stefan Fölster and 
Sam Peltzman found that Sweden’s high prices and weak productivity 
growth were partly attributable to lax competition policy and anticompeti-
tive regulations. These policies made it diﬃcult for new ﬁ  rms to enter some 
markets, eﬀectively protecting less- eﬃcient producers. The country’s change 
in policies in these areas has opened up regulated markets to competition 
and has contributed to an increased import penetration, from 29 to 48 per-
cent, which presumably helped to raise productivity and to keep prices lower 
than they otherwise would have been. But because the public sector is so 
important in Sweden, Fölster and Peltzman in chapter 8 in this volume shift 
their focus to how local public-  sector policy aﬀects the local economy—
particularly the private sector.
Local governments in Sweden account for approximately one quarter of 
GDP and of total employment, which is about twice the corresponding U.S. 
ﬁ  gures. They dominate most publicly ﬁ  nanced social services, such as health 
care, education, child care, and elderly care, as well as many technical ser-
vices. Some privatization has occurred, with the private providers’ share of 
publicly ﬁ  nanced services reaching 20 percent in Stockholm and 9 percent 
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Using panel data for 290 municipalities and various indicators of public 
policy, including local tax rates and an index of perceived business friend-
liness from a survey of business, Fölster and Peltzman ﬁ  nd that munici-
palities that have low tax rates or that are perceived as friendly to business 
have higher incomes. Reading the relation between tax rates and income as 
going from tax rates to income, they estimate that a 1- point increase in local 
tax rates, corresponding to a 3 percent tax hike, is associated with 2.4 per-
cent lower income. The implicit elasticity suggests that most of the revenue 
increase from the tax hike is eroded by a reduction in the tax base. Causation 
could run the other way, however, as low-  income municipalities must have 
higher taxes to fund mandated public services. But Sweden’s intramunicipal-
ity equalization system largely equalizes the tax base and diﬀerent spending 
needs due to demographic diﬀerences to enable local governments to provide 
mandated services uniformly. This makes it unlikely that the main causal 
eﬀect runs from low incomes to high taxes. Moreover, taxes at the begin-
ning of the period are associated with lower growth—a striking ﬁ  nding that 
aroused considerable interest and controversy at our conference.
At the opposite end of the economic spectrum is the global economy. In 
our earlier volume, Edward Leamer and Per Lundborg warned that increased 
competition from low-  wage countries such as China and the ex-  Soviet bloc 
would reduce the country’s success in the international economy. Unless 
Sweden could maintain a more skill-  intensive product mix in its exports—
moving away from the comparative advantage of these new entrants—it 
would ﬁ  nd itself in head-  on competition with low-  wage countries in labor-
 intensive  products.
In chapter 9, Leamer presents correlations between the product mix of 
diﬀerent countries’ exports in 1987 and 1999 that reveal dramatic changes 
in the competition between high- income and low- income countries. In 1987. 
the correlation between the export product mix of high-  income countries 
and low-  income countries in the U.S. and EU markets was low, because 
capital-  rich countries specialized in capital-  intensive products, while labor-
  rich countries specialized in labor-  intensive products. By 1999, this had 
changed. Product mixes in all countries had become more similar. The 
correlation between the product mixes of China and Sweden in exports 
to the European Union rose to over 0.50, implying some direct competi-
tion between high-  wage Sweden and low-  wage China. China also became 
a more serious competitor with Sweden in the U.S. market. The reason is 
that China has increased its presence in Sweden’s most important export 
sectors: machinery and electrical machinery. Still, because there are great 
diﬀerences in technology and products within industries, within-  industry 
specialization should allow Sweden to avoid much direct competition with 
low-  wage Chinese ﬁ  rms for some time. Leamer concludes that the key issue 
is to invest in human and physical capital in order to avoid direct competition 
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the Internet and the personal computer may be altering the labor market’s 
compensation for talent, creating “a Hollywood kind of inequality” that 
cannot easily be compensated by increased education. Talent has become 
the scarce resource and must be rewarded more to work more hours. Such 
wage inequality creates a problem for an egalitarian welfare state.
The Welfare State in (Continuous) Transition
The old saying, “If it ain’t broke, don’t ﬁ  x it”—I never bought into that. I think 
you try to get things working the best you can and don’t wait until the whole thing 
is falling apart and then ﬁ  gure out there’s a problem. A lot of times you see the 
problems before they actually occur if you look carefully.
—Bill Belichick, U.S. football coach, at a press conference on December 22, 2005
The ﬁ  rst NBER- SNS project analyzed the Swedish economy when it was 
“broke,” and it was unclear if the economy could make a strong or rapid 
recovery. Recovery required tough reforms and more reliance on market 
forces, we argued. Sweden rose to this challenge in many ways.
In the decade following the crisis, Sweden adopted a ﬂ  exible exchange rate 
and a more disciplined monetary policy; lowered government employment 
and the government share of national income and eliminated a huge budget 
deﬁ  cit; lowered unemployment insurance modestly; and began to reform its 
sickness pay insurance—all of which arguably helped the economic recovery 
by reducing distortions in economic incentives. The country also deregulated 
markets, reformed taxes, privatized the delivery of some social services, and 
strengthened the pension system in economically sensible ways. The reforms 
were accompanied by a moderate rise in income inequality, but the vast 
majority of Swedes beneﬁ  ted from the changes, with disposable incomes 
improving throughout the income distribution. Real disposable income 
increased for the ﬁ  rst time in decades.
The economy is no longer broken, but it still faces important challenges. 
In an interconnected welfare state, problems can compound to endanger 
ﬁ  scal stability and the sustainability of prosperity, as the early 1990s experi-
ence made clear. Because the welfare costs of social interventions rise with 
the square of the magnitude of the intervention, it is critical that countries 
with large welfare states run programs eﬃciently and squeeze programs that 
do not deliver the desired gains in equity. Currently, public beneﬁ  t schemes, 
including unemployment, sickness insurance, and early retirement, sup-
port 20 percent of working-  age individuals. This requires sizable budgetary 
expenses and taxes that reduce the rewards to working relative to beneﬁ  t 
levels. Wage compression and large tax wedges contribute to the weakness 
in the job market by creating incentives for nonmarket and black market 
work relative to employment in small private-  service ﬁ  rms in the regular 
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Given the evidence that active labor market programs do not work well 
in Sweden and that the sickness insurance system encourages more sickness 
leave than elsewhere, these would seem to be areas where further reforms 
could improve eﬃciency without harming equity. The evidence also shows 
that Sweden’s high taxes, which create a large wedge between an individual’s 
productivity and ability to consume, cause disincentives and distortions and 
could be lowered at little or no cost to egalitarian goals. In light of economic 
developments worldwide that favor skilled labor, there is a potential long-
 term danger that over time, Sweden’s wage distribution will deviate more and 
more from market realities, which raise the cost of egalitarianism.
On the basis of its post- 1994 recovery, the Swedish economy seems capable 
of bending to changing market forces without sacriﬁ  cing its extraordinary 
success in eliminating poverty, but that presumably will require continual 
policy innovation. The large fraction of national output devoted to public 
consumption that beneﬁ  ts all citizens, regardless of their personal incomes, 
and its strong social safety net give Sweden, more than many other countries, 
the space to experiment with policies that produce more eﬃciency without 
sacriﬁ  cing egalitarian goals.7 With a population that seems to respond sub-
stantially to modest changes in incentives, perhaps because given changes 
carry more weight in a relatively egalitarian society than in a society with a 
highly unequal distribution of earnings, even modest changes might produce 
substantial gains in eﬃciency.
Conclusion
We began this introduction by noting that the Swedish welfare state 
was arguably the most ambitious eﬀort by a capitalist market economy to 
reduce inequality and eliminate poverty. The 1990s crisis and the slow eco-
nomic growth that preceded it highlighted the Swedish model’s deﬁ  cien-
cies and fragility. During our ﬁ  rst study, there was fear that the Swedish 
model was no longer viable. If the precrisis assessment of the Swedish model 
was overly optimistic, the crisis-  period assessment was overly pessimistic. 
Sweden’s recovery shows that it is possible to run a reasonably successful 
market economy while still devoting considerable resources to a welfare 
state that maintains economic equality and to surmount an economic crisis. 
This is probably easier to do in smaller economies than in larger ones and 
in more homogeneous countries than in more heterogeneous ones, so Swe-
den’s experiences are not easily transferable to the United States or other 
7. In its 2007 Sweden report, the OECD (79) shows that neither eliminating the top state 
income tax bracket nor reducing the state income tax by 5 percent would alter Sweden’s position 
as the country with the second- most equal income distribution (after Denmark) among OECD 
countries. Eliminating the state income tax completely, thereby making the income tax scale ﬂ  at 
(lowering top marginal rates from 55 to 30 percent), would move Sweden from number two to 
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large economies. It is also easier to do so in a society where the vast bulk of 
the citizenry is committed to egalitarian goals, as in Sweden, rather than in 
societies where the polity is divided over the weight to place on equity com-
pared to eﬃciency. Faced with crisis, Sweden modiﬁ  ed policies and reduced 
some beneﬁ  ts that had substantial eﬃciency costs. It became more market 
reliant and open to competition and to individual choice, giving a stronger 
economic base for maintaining the welfare state. Sweden’s market-  oriented 
reforms arguably had a ﬁ  rst-  order impact on eﬃciency but only a second-
  order impact on equity, buttressing the welfare state while improving the 
general economic welfare of Swedes.
We recognize that our reading of the evidence contrasts with the views of 
some other analysts of Sweden’s welfare state, who are less inclined toward 
market reforms and who are fearful that moves to the market invariably 
endanger the welfare state. Walter Korpi, a long-  time scholar and defender 
of the welfare state, argues that economists put too much emphasis on the 
adverse eﬀects of high taxes (and presumably, wage compression) on incen-
tives and economic eﬃciency:
If citizens ﬁ  nd that they get signiﬁ  cant beneﬁ  ts in return for their taxes, 
their take- home pay is no longer the only basis for work incentives. . . . If 
tax payments are seen as providing individual beneﬁ  ts and the free-  rider 
problem can be overcome, the eﬀects of tax wedges will tend to decrease. 
(Korpi and Palme 1998, 682)
To be sure, citizens with the attitudes described by Korpi are likely to 
respond less to taxation than others, which will decrease the distortionary 
eﬀects of taxes, beneﬁ  ts, and compressed wages. But it is hard to see why 
individuals should have these attitudes—the taxes they pay are not tied to 
the beneﬁ  ts they receive, so why would the beneﬁ  ts induce a willingness to 
work? The conditioning phrase, “If . . . the free rider problem can be over-
come,” merely sweeps the problem under the rug. Experiments with pris-
oner’s dilemma and public-  goods games show that some people behave as 
free riders, while others are more likely to play cooperatively. More directly, 
the problem is apparent in the Swedish data we have been discussing—it is 
simply implausible, for example, that the extraordinarily high rates of sick-
ness absence in Sweden reﬂ  ect anything other than free riding on a system 
that provides beneﬁ  ts for not working.
The critical question is whether responses to tax wedges/ wage compression 
are large enough in the aggregate to aﬀect market outcomes. One approach 
to this question has been to compare the growth performance of countries 
with diﬀerent degrees of market intervention or sizes of governments or to 
compare Sweden’s performance with that of other developed economies 
(Korpi 2005; Agell, Ohlsson, and Skogman Thoursie 2006; Håkansson and 
Lindbeck 2005; Fölster and Henrekson 2001). However, specifying aggregate 
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The analyses in this volume take a diﬀerent approach, empirically exam-
ining the impacts of Swedish institutions at a more micro level. They direct 
attention to several areas in which responses to tax wedges/  wage compres-
sion do seem to aﬀect market outcomes: hours worked in the market com-
pared to hours worked in household production or grey market activities; 
the abnormally small private-  service sector; the expansion of university 
training as the education diﬀerential rose; the abnormally large amount of 
time spent in sickness leave; and the increased duration of unemployment 
spells associated with the long duration of beneﬁ  ts and time on active labor 
market programs that do not improve skills much, if at all. The issue of 
the magnitude of the eﬀects of tax wedges is one of positive social science, 
not one of normative analysis. Whether the estimated costs in eﬃciency 
are large or small relative to the gains in equity from any intervention is a 
normative issue that the body politic decides through democratic processes. 
The typical American is much less committed to egalitarian ideals than is 
the typical Swede, is more trusting of markets, and is more sensitive to the 
costs of government programs, which leads the United States to rely more on 
markets than does Sweden. But the basic economics in assessing the eﬀects 
of programs in attaining their goals and the eﬃciency costs thereof is the 
same. Decisions about how to deal with the costs and trade-  oﬀs between 
economic performance and equity that we and other economists point out 
will be made within the context of the social institutions and goals desired 
by Swedes. It is, after all, the Swedish model.
We have been impressed that in dealing with the crisis and other economic 
problems that have beset the Swedish model, public-  and private- sector deci-
sion makers have been creative in ﬁ  nding economically sensible solutions to 
problems—in some cases, with greater success than the United States, such 
as in pension reform. Our research suggests that such adjustments are a nec-
essary part of a welfare state operating in a market economy. Welfare state 
policies cannot remain static but must continuously evolve to meet changing 
economic realities. New market conditions driven by technology, trade, and 
international migration impinge on what policy and institutions can achieve. 
The welfare state should be a learning state that adjusts policies to changes 
in their costs and in their success in attaining egalitarian ideals. The reforms 
that Sweden has undertaken since the crisis show, political diﬀerences among 
parties notwithstanding, that Sweden is a pragmatic reformer, willing and 
able to undertake reforms when necessary, while continuing to preserve the 
essence of its welfare state.
Facing and dealing with the trade-  oﬀs between equity and performance 
requires considerable political and social will. Countries that admire Swe-
den’s distributional outcomes presumably would need similar capacity to 
respond to costs and crisis. From one perspective, a welfare state requires 
greater social and political perspicuity about economics, particularly by pol-
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The latter has problems of its own, as the current meltdown in U.S. ﬁ  nancial 
markets has demonstrated. Nevertheless, the welfare state remains a work 
in progress that must balance the beneﬁ  ts of more egalitarian outcomes 
against the social costs of market ineﬃciencies caused by those very beneﬁ  ts. 
Perhaps the most important lesson for other countries from the Swedish 
experience is that it isn’t easy to be Sweden.
Appendix
Important Policy Changes, 1985 to 2008 
(Year it became eﬀective in parentheses)
The years of enactment show that important market- oriented reforms were 
decided by Social Democratic and center-  right governments alike. Sweden 
had a center- right government from 1991 to 1994 and again from September 
2006—ﬁ  ve of the twenty-  three years covered in this box. The broad outline 
of reforms has had broad political support and has meant that welfare state 
arrangements have remained largely intact, but government expenditures 
have been reined in and the economy has become more competitive.
Macro policy reforms:
Financial market deregulation (1985)
Restrictions on international portfolio investment lifted (1989)
Flexible exchange rate cum inﬂ  ation targeting (1992)
EU membership (1994)
Electoral periods at national and local levels lengthened from three to four 
years (1994)
New budget process for central government (1997)
Independent central bank (1999)
Surplus target for consolidated public budgets (central and local govern-
ments, public pension system; 2000), currently set at 1 percent of GDP
The deregulation of ﬁ  nancial markets contributed to the credit expansion 
in the late 1980s and subsequently to the serious crisis in the early 1990s. 
Later macro policy reforms helped the economy stabilize by maintaining 
a low rate of inﬂ  ation and by reducing public expenditures and the deﬁ  cit. 
The new budget process, with expenditure ceilings for central government 
expenditures set for three years at a time, meant that total expenditures 
could no longer be arrived at by adding together individual expenditures 
from the bottom up. The lengthening of electoral periods was intended to 
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ship was ﬁ  nally more of a political than an economic change. It did not 
drastically alter Sweden’s relationships with the EU market, because access 
in most areas had been granted under the previous European Economic 
Space (EES) agreement, but it made Sweden a more integrated part of the 
political union.
Tax and funding reforms:
Tax reform (1991)
Pension reform (1999)
Gift and inheritance tax abolished (2005)
Wealth tax abolished (2007)
Earned income tax credit (2007)
Tax relief on household services (2007)
The 1990/ 1991 tax reform, which broadened the base and reduced top mar-
ginal rates, reduced the many distortions caused by the old tax system. The 
pension reform was forward-  looking and transformed the pay-  as-  you-  go 
system to a quasi- funded and more actuarial system, which is more resilient 
to demographic and economic changes. The earned income tax credits are 
signiﬁ  cant in size and help to make work more proﬁ  table than living oﬀ of 
social beneﬁ  ts for low earners. Tax relief for household services is intended to 
oﬀset the tax wedge, which discourages the purchase of such services outside 
the grey/  black economy and the growth of a small private-  service sector.
The abolition of the gift and inheritance tax was intended to facilitate 
small, owner-  run ﬁ  rms to pass to the next generation. The abolition of the 
wealth tax was motivated by the fact that it was no longer paid by the really 
wealthy, that most other EU countries had done away with it, and that it 
may encourage those who had moved their funds abroad to bring them back 
to Sweden.





Telephone and postal services (1993)
New competition law (1993)
Electricity (1996)
The deregulation of network industries and other traditional monopolies 
allowed new entry and increased competition in these industries, and as a 
result, it contributed to increased productivity. The new competition law 
recognized that the government could play a role in ensuring a competitive 
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Public- sector  reforms:
Private provision of local government-  ﬁ  nanced services (after 1990)
Voucher system for primary and secondary schools (1991)
The services continue to be tax ﬁ  nanced. The school voucher system allows 
private schools (including for-  proﬁ  t schools) to compete freely with the 
public school system.
Replacement rates in social insurance:
Sickness insurance lowered (1993 to 1998), then restored (1998)
Unemployment insurance lowered (Capping has eroded replacement rates 
for above- median wages since 1992; from 2007, it was also lowered below 
the cap, from 80 to 70 percent after forty weeks and from 70 to 65 percent 
after sixty weeks.)
Terms and replacement rates in social insurance have changed frequently, 
back and forth. When beneﬁ  t conditions have been tightened, sickness rates 
and unemployment have gone down. Replacement rates in UI for above-
  median earners have fallen substantially.
Active labor market program reforms:
Participation no longer qualiﬁ  es for UI (2000)
Programs scaled down (2007)
The ALMP has undergone a substantial change, which, at least in nor-
mal times, means that there will be considerably fewer participants in the 
reformed programs.
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